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the case or controversy philosophy is evidenced by a palpable re-

luctance to make use of the device.' 9
If the advantages of inter-sovereign certification should be
determined by the federal judiciary to outweigh the disadvantages, further use of the device to implement, or to an extent to
supplant, the usual type of abstention may perhaps be expected.
It is to be hoped that cognizance of some of the possibilities
noted here will be taken before widespread use is undertaken.
David W. Robertson

1958 Amendment to the United States Judicial Code
Relative to the Denial of Costs to a Plaintiff
Since the Judiciary Act of 1789, there has been a jurisdictional amount requirement for suits brought in federal courts
where jurisdiction is predicated on diversity of citizenship between the parties.' In 1958, in an effort to reduce the number
of cases brought in the federal courts,2 Congress raised the
jurisdictional amount, exclusive of interest and costs, from
$3,000 to $10,000. 3 Included in this statute is a provision allow19. Although the United States Supreme Court's jurisdiction over questions
certified from the courts of appeal is theoretically mandatory, the cases where certificates have been dismissed, as improperly framed or as containing questions
improper for certification, are practically legion. E.g., Busby v. Electrical Utilities
Employees Union, 323 U.S. 72 (1944) ; NLRB v. White Swan Co., 313 U.S. 23
(1941) ; Atlas Life Insurance Co. v. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563 (1939) ; Lowden
v. Northwestern National Bank & Trust Co., 298 U.S. 160 (1936) ; State-Planters
Bank and Trust Co. v. Parker, 283 U.S. 332 (1931). The Lowden case contains
an illuminating exposition by Justice Cardozo of the Supreme Court's policy as
to certified questions of law, including discussion of the case or controversy requirement. See also Moore & Vestal, Present and Potential Role of Certification
in Federal Appellate Procedure, 35 VA. L. REv. 1 (1949).
1. The Act of September 24, 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78, provided that the
value of the matter in controversy must exceed $500. This was raised to $2,000
in 1887, to $3,000 in 1911, and to $10,000 in 1958. See 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 817, 0.90 (2d ed. 1960).
2. See H.R. Rep. No. 1706, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1958), in which it is
stated: "In adopting this legislation the committee feels that it will bring the
minimum amount in controversy up to a reasonable level by contemporary standards and that it will ease the workload of our Federal courts by reducing the
number of cases involving corporations which come into Federal district courts
on the fictional premises that a diversity of citizenship exists."
3. 72 Stat. 415 (1958), amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1952). In addition to the provision increasing the jurisditcional amount and providing that
costs may be denied the plaintiff in certain instances, the statute also provides
that a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of the state where it has its principal
place of business and that civil actions in any state court arising under the
workmen's compensation laws of that state may not be removed to federal district

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXI

ing a judge to deny costs to a successful plaintiff or to impose

costs on him in the event that he recovers less than the jurisdictional amount.4 The provision's applicability is limited to
final judgments 5 in suits filed originally in federal courts,6 and
the amount recovered is to be computed without regard to any
setoffs or counterclaims.7 The apparent purpose of this amendment was to reduce the number of cases brought in federal court
by providing for the discretionary imposition of costs in the
situation where the plaintiff recovers a judgment under the
jurisdictional amount."
Under Rule 54 (d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
court. For discussion of the 1958 statute see Cowen, Federal JurisdictionAmended,
44 VA. L. REV. 971 (1958) ; Friedenthal, New Limitations on Federal Jurisdiction, 11 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1959) ; Wollett, Federal Jurisdiction and Practice,
35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 145 (1960) ; Wright, Act 85-554 of 1958 and the Disposal of
the Judicial Power of the United States, 6 LA. B.J. 147 (1958) ; Notes, 58
COLUM. L. REV. 1287 (1958), 72 HARv. L. REV. 391 (1958), 53 Nw. L. REV. 637
(1958), 33 TUL. L. REV. 167 (1958), 6 UTAH L. REV. 231 (1958).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(b) (1958), as amended by 72 Stat. 415 (1958) : "Except
when express provision therefor is otherwise made in a statute of the United
States, where the plaintiff who files the case originally in the Federal courts is
finally adjudged to be entitled to recover less than the sum or value of $10,000,
computed without regard to any setoff or counterclaim to which the defendant
may be adjudged to be entitled, and exclusive of interest and costs, the district
court may deny costs to the plaintiff and, in addition, may impose costs on the
plaintiff."
Id. § 1331(b), as amended by 72 Stat. 415 (1958): "Except when express
provision therefor is otherwise made in a statute of the United States, where the
plaintiff is finally adjudged to be entitled to recover less than the sum or value
of $10,000, computed without regard to any setoff or counterclaim to which the
defendant may be adjudged to be entitled, and exclusive of interest and costs, the
district court may deny costs to the plaintiff and, in addition, may impose costs
on the plaintiff."
5. The statute contains the language "where the plaintiff is finally adjudged
"1..28 U.S.C. § 1331(b) (1958).
A similar provision is found in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(b) (1958). In the Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary, it is
stated that "this provision will apply only to amounts determined by a verdict
or a final judgment decided by the court; not to compromise agreements." H.R.
Rep. No. 1706, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1958).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(b) (1958), dealing with diversity citizenship jurisdiction,
limits the applicability of the statute to "the plaintiff who files the case originally
in the Federal courts." This provision was added by amendment in order to prevent the assessment of costs on the plaintiff whose action was removed from state
court. However, no such provision was incorporated in the section dealing with
federal question jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it would seem that the intent was
that the limitation should apply to both. See 104 Cong. Rec. 12689 (daily ed.
June 30, 1958). See also Wollett, Federal Jurisdiction and Practice, 35 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 145, 147 (1960).
7. Both 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331(b) and 1332(b) (1958) state that the sum is to
be "computed without regard to any setoff or counterclaim to which the defendant
may be adjudged to be entitled."
8. H.R. Rep. No. 1706, 85th Cong., 2d Sass. 5 (1958) : "To make the $10,000
limitation a forceful one and to prevent inflated claims, the committee has inserted a subsection permitting the trial judge to either withhold costs and/or
impose costs on the plaintiff if the plaintiff fails to obtain a judgment for at least
the jurisdictional amount."
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federal court has the power to assess costs in its discretion.'

Under this authority costs have been denied to a successful
plaintiff who recovered only the amount previously tendered

0
into the court by the defendant, and costs have been appor-

tioned where the plaintiff was successful on only a part of the
claim." The 1958 amendment would appear to inject a new
notion into the scheme

-

to deny costs to plaintiff or assess

costs against him in the situation where a successful plaintiff
recovers less than the jurisdictional amount. While the amend2
ment provides for discretion in this situation,' it contains no
language suggesting what criterion should be used by the court.
Several interpretations of the amendment would appear possible. Perhaps the interpretation which most readily comes to

mind is a test based on the plaintiff's good faith in claiming
over $10,000 exclusive of interest and costs. Under this test, the
court would deny costs if it were felt that the plaintiff's claim
for an amount in excess of $10,000 was not made in good faith
and the plaintiff in fact recovered less than $10,000. The adoption of such a test derives some support from the legislative
history' 8 and from the only cases thus far interpreting the
9. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d) : "Except when express provision therefor is made
either in a statute of the United States or in these rules, costs shall be allowed
as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; but costs
against the United States, its officers, and agencies shall be imposed only to the
extent permitted by law."
10. Western Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 95 F. Supp. 993 (W.D.
Mo. 1951). But see Schmieding v. American Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 138 F.
Supp. 167 (D. Neb. 1955) (costs awarded to plaintiff even though he recovered
only an amount which defendant had previously tendered into court).
11. Dyker Bldg. Co. v. United States, 182 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (the
district court did not abuse its discretion under FED. R. CIv. P. 54(d) in dividing
the costs of the reference to a special master where the amount claimed was substantially more than the award) ; United States v. Madsen Const. Co., 139 F.2d
613 (6th Cir. 1943) (90% of costs assessed against intervenor who claimed
$65,579.43 and recovered $814.94) ; Steel Const. Co. v. Louisiana Highway
Comm'n, 60 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. La. 1945) (where 9/10ths of the record related
to matters on which plaintiff was unsuccessful, costs were apportioned on the
basis of 90% against the plaintiff and 10% against the defendant). But see
Brown v. Consolidated Fisheries Co., 18 F.R.D. 433 (D. Del. 1955) (full costs
allowed plaintiff recovering $1,471.33 on a claim for $26,581.59) ; Schmieding v.
American Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 138 F. Supp. 167 (D. Neb. 1955) (costs allowed
plaintiff recovering $33.37 on a claim for $5,300 and an accounting).
12. Although the statute grants discretion to the trial court either to deny
costs to a successful plaintiff or to impose costs on him, this paper will be confined to the denial of costs. It would seem, however, that analytically no great
difference should exist between the two as to when the statute becomes operative,
the power to impose costs coming into play in the more aggravated situations.
13. H.R. Rep. No. 1706, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1958) : "In deciding whether
to deny costs and/or impose costs on the plaintiff, the court will undoubtedly take
into consideration whether the amount claimed was made in good faith or whether
it was made simply to get into Federal court."
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amendment. 14 However, the adoption of a good faith test appears to raise serious questions. It is clear from the decisions'
and from Rule 12(h)' 6 that dismissal for lack of jurisdiction
is required whenever a court finds that the jurisdictional amount
is not present. The test which has been evolved for determining
whether a claim satisfies this jurisdictional requisite is often
stated to be the amount exclusive of interest and costs claimed
by the plaintiff in good faith. 7 Under the jurisprudence, the
amount demanded in the complaint has been held to fix the
jurisdiction prima facie unless made solely for the purpose of
conferring jurisdiction or unless it is clear from the face of the
record that the requisite sum is in fact absent.'" Consequently,
if either of these two factors is found to be present, the plaintiff is deemed not to be in good faith and the complaint is dismissed. Thus it can be seen that if "good faith" means the same
thing for the purpose of jurisdiction and for the purposes of
denying costs, the 1958 amendment will have no effect; for,
if the successful plaintiff is in "good faith," costs will not be
14. In Bockenek v. Germann, 191 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Mich. 1960) the plaintiffs recovered less than the jurisdictional amount and the defendant asked that
plaintiffs' costs be denied and that defendant's costs be awarded under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(b). On the basis of the legislative history the court apparently adopted
a good faith test and, on a finding that the plaintiffs did act in good faith when
they claimed an amount in excess of the jurisdictional minimum, refused to deny
costs.
In Stachon v. Hoxie, 190 F. Supp. 185 (W.D. Mich. 1960), although plaintiff had demanded more than the required $10,000 jurisdictional amount, the
jury verdict in favor of plaintiff had been for $8,000. Defendant sought to prevent
his being taxed for any of the court costs. However, the court refused to deny
costs to plaintiff apparently on the ground that a plaintiff who recovers less than
the jurisdictional requirement will be denied costs only if his claim for damages
in excess of the jurisdictional requirement was not made in good faith. Consequently, after finding that at the time the plaintiff began the suit he could
reasonably have expected to recover a verdict for the jurisdictional amount, the
court rejected defendant's motion to deny costs to plaintiff. There is language in
the opinion which suggests an even lesser scope of application for the statute;
for at one point the court states that the statute was intended to be applied only
in cases where the plaintiff has obviously acted in bad faith in claiming over
$10,000 in order to 'bring the action in federal court.
15. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178 (1936). See
St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938) ; Food
Fair Stores, Inc. v. Food Fair, Inc., 177 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1949).
16. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h) which provides: "A party waives all defenses
and objections which he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no motion, in his answer or reply, except . . . (2) that,
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action."
17. 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 827, 0.91 (2d ed. 1960). In St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1937), it was stated that
"the rule governing dismissal for want of jurisdiction in cases brought in the
federal court is that, unless the law gives a different rule, the sum claimed by
the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith."
18. Ilsen & Sordell, The Monetary Minimum in Federal Court Jurisdiction,29
ST. JouNs's L. REV. 1-35, 183-225, at 4 (1954).
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denied him under this interpretation of the amendment, and,
if he is not in "good faith," the complaint should be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction, thereby affording no opportunity for
the denial of costs. On the other hand, if "good faith" in the

context of the 1958 amendment is interpreted as being different
from that in the area of jurisdiction, it can be seen that there
would be some area for application for the statute, the size of
the area depending upon the gap between the two definitions. 19
However, in addition to the confusion which would seem to

result from having two definitions, it would seem that the scope
of application of the amendment would still be relatively small.

Because of this, it would seem that perhaps a different test
should be adopted to cover the denial of costs in those situations
19. If the "good faith" approach is adopted, it can be seen that the scope of
application of the statute will be directly dependent upon the definition of "good
faith" for the purposes of jurisdiction and of denying costs. Thus, the scope of
application of the statute will increase to the extent that the gap between the
two definitions increases. It would seem, however, that the scope of application
of the statute in any event would tend to be relatively small. As pointed out in
the text, the test of "good faith" for the purposes of jurisdiction is that the amount
claimed by the plaintiff will control unless made solely for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction or unless it is made clear on the face of the record that the
requisite sum is in fact not present. In this connection the United States Supreme
Court has stated that in order to justify a dismissal, it must appeal to a legal
certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount. St. Paul
Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938). Consequently, it
would seem that it would be relatively difficult to dismiss a case on the basis of
lack of good faith on the part of the plaintiff in claiming an amount in excess
of the jurisdictional amount. Thus, the scope of application of the statute would
appear to be determined by the definition given the other variable - "good faith"
for the purposes of denying costs.
In Stachon v. Hoxie, 190 F. Supp. 185, 186 (W.D. Mich. 1960), the court
made several statements on this point. (1) "[T]he court concludes that § 1332(b)
was intended to be applied only in cases where the plaintiff had obviously acted
in bad faith in claiming over $10,000 in order to 'bring the action in a Federal
court." (2) "There is no showing whatever from which it could be concluded
that the plaintiff acted in bad faith in claiming an amount in excess of the jurisdictional requirement." (3) "The court is convinced that the plaintiff's claim for
damages was made in good faith and not merely to give a Federal court jurisdiction." (4) "However, from the evidence presented it appears that the plaintiff at
the time he began the action could reasonably have expected to recover a verdict
for the jurisdictional amount of more than $10,000." Although it might appear that
these various statements mean the same thing, there would appear to be some
shades of meaning in them which might vary the scope of application of the
statute. If "legal certainty" is adopted as the definition of the jurisdictional
variable, the definition of the "costs" variable as being "obviously in bad faith"
would seem to preclude all application of the statute; for if it cannot be said
that it was not legally certain that the plaintiff's claim is for less than the
jurisdictional amount, it would seem that it could not be said that the plaintiff
was in obvious bad faith in claiming over $10,000. On the other hand, it would
seem that it could be said that although it was not legally certain that the plaintiff's claim was for less than $10,000 (hence, the court would have jurisdiction),
still the plaintiff could not reasonably have expected to recover a verdict for more
than the jurisdictional amount (hence costs could be denied plaintiff if he recovered a judgment under $10,000). However, even this would seem to give
relatively little scope of application to the statute.
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where the plaintiff recovers less than the jurisdictional amount.
A rule indiscriminately denying costs for recovery of less than
$10,000 exclusive of interest and costs would seem to be precluded by the discretionary language of the statute.2 However,
it might be possible to devise a test which would not be imposed
indiscriminately and yet would give some effect to the statute.
One basis of such a test might be the estimation of the judge
as to the percentage of cases similar to the type before him in
which the amount recovered by the plaintiff was less than
$10,000. Thus, with respect to particular alleged injuries or
damages, the judge may know from experience that in, for example, 10% of the cases where the plaintiff has in fact recovered has the amount been less than $10,000. This method of
analysis could be used for the formulation of a rule to the effect
that if a plaintiff in fact recovers less than $10,000, costs should
be denied him if (assuming he would recover some amount) his
chances of recovering less than $10,000 were above a certain
percentage. In computing these chances, it would seem that
the computation should be confined to a consideration of the
amounts actually recovered and should not include any consideration of the chances of recovery vel non. If a figure of
50% were chosen, the judge, after considering the amount of
the recovery in cases of a similar nature, would deny costs to
the plaintiff who in fact recovered under $10,000 if he felt that
in 50% of those cases of a similar nature the amount when
recovered was under $10,000. The adoption of such a rule would
give effect to the statute and would seem to discourage the
bringing of marginal cases in federal courts. However, it might
be felt that a rule of this nature would be unnecessarily complicated.
Another test might be formulated on the basis of cases involving remittitur on a motion for a new trial. One criterion
for determining when a trial judge should grant a new trial is
where a verdict is grossly excessive or shocks the court's conscience. 2 ' If the trial judge considers the motion for a new
trial meritorious, it may either grant it or make its refusal to
grant it conditioned on the plaintiff's remitting a stated portion
of the amount.22 If the idea here involved were used as a basis
20. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331(b), 1332(b) (1958): "[T]he district court may deny
costs to the plaintiff and, in addition, may impose costs on the plaintiff."
(Emphasis added.)
21. 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 3741-43, 59.05[3] (1953).
22. Id. at 3737, 59.05[3].
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for a rule governing the denial of costs to a plaintiff who recovered under $10,000, a judge would deny costs in those cases
where, had the jury returned a judgment of more than $10,000,
he would have felt obligated to require a remittitur to an amount
less than $10,000.23 Although the subject of remittitur bears little
relation to the assessing of costs, such a test would be one with
which the trial courts are familiar.
Another possible approach would be to vest discretion to
deny costs to the successful plaintiff in the trial judge with little
review on the part of the appellate courts, rather than adopting
any one rule to be applied in all cases. Under this view, each
trial judge would be accorded relatively large latitude in applying the statute and could perhaps apply it with a view toward
the condition of his docket. Since the trial judge is given broad
discretion under Rule 54(d) in assessing costs and since the
adoption of any inflexible rule might not be feasible, this posi24
tion might be best under the circumstances.
In conclusion it would seem that the 1958 statutory provision
relative to the assessment of costs creates more problems that
it solves. If a good faith test were adopted, it would seem that
the statute would have relatively little effect. If a stricter rule
were adopted, the statute would be given some effect and would
serve to discourage marginal cases. Such a result would be in
keeping with the general purpose of the 1958 amendments to
decrease the number of cases brought in federal courts. However, it may be wondered whether the use of the device of denying costs to a successful plaintiff is a proper method for achieving this result.
George C. Herget, Jr.
23. Id. at 3743-45, 59.05[3]. As to determining the amount of the remittitur,
Moore points out that most courts have not articulated any definite standard by
which to determine the amount of the remittitur. One court has taken the position
that the amount remitted should reduce the verdict to the lowest amount that
could reasonably be found by the jury. Others would reduce the verdict only to
the maximum that would be upheld by the trial court as not excessive.
In such a situation, there would generally be no question of lack of jurisdiction, since the plaintiff could be in good faith in asking for more than the jurisdictional amount even though the judge might require that he accept a remittitur
if he recovered more than $10,000.
24. As for what criterion the trial court would use in applying the amendment, it would seem that it might use one or more of the above-mentioned approaches as factors to be considered.

